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Abstract 
The ‘currency war’, as it has become known, has three aspects: 1) the inflexible pegs of 
undervalued currencies; 2) recent attempts by floating exchange-rate countries to resist 
currency appreciation; 3) quantitative easing. Europe should primarily be concerned 
about the first issue, which relates to the renewed debate about the international 
monetary system. The attempts of floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency 
appreciation are generally justified while China retains a peg. Quantitative easing cannot 
be deemed a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy as long as the Fed’s policy is geared towards 
price stability. Current US inflationary expectations are at historically low levels. Central 
banks should come to an agreement about the definition of price stability at a time of 
deflationary pressures. The euro’s exchange rate has not been greatly impacted by the 
recent currency war; the euro continues to be overvalued, but less than before. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
While emerging countries recover reasonably quickly from the crisis, the recovery in 
advanced countries has been unspectacular, and unemployment has risen significantly, 
especially in the United States and the crisis-affected European countries. The US, the 
country with largest current-account deficit, continues to stimulate its economy using 
monetary tools, weakening the US dollar and all currencies that are tied to the US dollar. 
As a by-product of US monetary policy, capital flows to emerging countries with open 
capital accounts have accelerated, pushing up their currencies. This is thought to 
threaten economic recovery in emerging economies and has resulted in various actions 
to limit appreciation. Japan and Switzerland have also intervened in the foreign-exchange 
market, while the UK’s quantitative easing has a downward pressure on sterling. But not 
all currencies can be weak at the same time. 
 
In this context, this paper aims to: 
• Clarify the currency war(s) debate and to assess its significance; 
• Discuss the motives behind national policy responses; 
• Assess the implications for the euro area. 
 
2. CURRENCY WARS: HOW SIGNIFICANT? 
2.1. The issue 
In October 2010, Brazil's finance minister Guido Mantega captured the spirit of the time 
when he spoke of currency war. The expression is reminiscent of the 1930s, when the 
major currencies relinquished the Gold Standard in an uncoordinated way. Then, it took 
two years after the crash, from October 1929 to September 1931, for Britain to sever 
sterling’s link to gold and set in motion a currency war. One country after another 
detached itself from gold, in effect trying to export its unemployment. But it became 
evident that not everybody can have a weak currency at the same time. A major lesson 
from the 1930s is that one of the roles of the multilateral system is to prevent futile 
beggar-thy-neighbour depreciation. 
Two years have passed since the high point of the financial crisis in September 2008. It 
would seem the same chain of events is being set in motion, with the same time lag. This 
reading is however too simplistic. As Avent (2010) has observed, the current situation is 
not one of ‘war’ between countries. Rather, countries face different challenges and 
policies carried out to achieve domestic economic goals differ. This in turn directly or 
indirectly impacts other countries through exchange rate developments. But exchange 
rate movements can be, and in some important respects are, part of an appropriate 
response to the asymmetric character of the current challenges. 
Indeed, whereas the Great Recession of 2008-09 was mostly a common shock affecting 
all major countries simultaneously, its aftermath has been highly asymmetric. Major 
asymmetries are seen between advanced and emerging/developing economies. 
Advanced countries are still struggling with the fallout from the financial crisis, but 
emerging and developing economies are again thriving. However, neither the advanced 
nor the emerging country groups are homogenous. For example, in the US damage to 
the supply-side seems to be limited, but private demand continues to be dented by the 
extent of household leverage. In Europe pessimism about the supply-side prevails, while 
private demand has on average been hit to a lesser degree than in the US. 
The existence of asymmetries does not rule out the possibility of beggar-thy-neighbour 
competitive depreciations in the context of weak global demand. But it does imply that 
divergences in policy approaches and the corresponding exchange-rate movements 
cannot by themselves be taken as signs of non-cooperative behaviour. We will continue 
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to speak of ‘currency war’, because this is the commonly used expression in this debate, 
but we want to point out from the outset that the expression can be misleading. 
2.2. Policy measures impacting currency movements 
When discussing the 'currency war', it is important to distinguish three main issues: 
• The decade-long dispute over the management of currencies pegged to the US 
dollar, first and foremost the Chinese renminbi, but also the currencies of other 
exporters of manufactured goods and oil producers; 
• Recent attempts by a number of floating exchange-rate countries to depreciate 
their currencies or at least to resist appreciation; 
• Unconventional monetary policy measures, such as the announcement by the US 
Federal Reserve of a new programme of asset purchases (known as QE2 – 
quantitative easing 2) which may impact on the exchange rate of the US dollar 
vis-à-vis all floating currencies, including the euro and other European currencies. 
The first of these issues, the US-China exchange rate debate, dates back at least to the 
middle of the last decade. The issue is if China’s exchange-rate policy amounts to a 
subsidy for its export sector. China has maintained a peg to the US dollar, except for a 
period from 2005 to 2008 when China allowed its currency to rise 17 percent against the 
dollar, but this nominal appreciation seems very limited against the background of rapid 
economic catching-up. China has accumulated and continues to accumulate huge 
foreign-exchange reserves. These developments suggest that the Chinese real exchange 
rate is indeed undervalued. We will not expand on the issue here because it has been 
extensively studied elsewhere, but it should be noted that China’s exchange-rate policy is 
relevant for the broader currency war debate in three important respects. First, China is 
a significant player in the world economy and its policy strongly affects the pace and 
magnitude of the required global rebalancing that the IMF (2010b) has called for. 
Second, China’s exchange-rate policy has major implications for the policies of other 
emerging and developing countries; as long as the renminbi does not appreciate, other 
countries do not want their currencies to appreciate either. Third, the bilateral China-US 
relationship is particularly sensitive and there is a risk that the tense discussion over 
exchange rates at some point spills over into the trade field. 
 
Table 1: Recently adopted policy measures to resist currency appreciation or 
favour depreciation in countries in a flexible exchange-rate regime 
Type of intervention  Country 
intervention  
Argentina, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Israel, Japan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
South Korea, Switzerland, Ukraine 
intervention fears Brazil, Chile, Thailand 
intervention talk India 
suspected intervention Philippines, Taiwan 
adjustment in reserve requirements Turkey 
 
Source: Adapted from Kaminska (2010). 
Note: Australia was included in Kaminska (2010) as a country that has intervened in the foreign-exchange 
market, but the intervention by the Reserve Bank of Australia in May 2010 aimed at strengthening the currency 
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and we have therefore excluded this case. Most measures were introduced between August and October 2010. 
Countries with pegged currencies, such as China, are not included. 
 
The second issue – measures to counter appreciation – concerns a large number of 
countries. Table 1 lists various kind of recent (mostly between August and October 2010) 
attempts to slow down currency appreciation, including actual interventions, suspected 
interventions and oral interventions. The fact that 20 countries are included in the table 
indicates that recent attempts to depreciate home currencies have been widespread. 
 
Intervention is only one way for countries to limit the impact of capital inflows. 
Increasingly, governments also rely on an array of capital-control measures (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Examples of capital controls and related measures  
Country  Measures taken or considered 
Brazil  Two increases in October of the financial operations tax 
(IOF) applicable to incoming foreign investment in fixed-
income instruments and funds.  
 
Increased tax on margin deposits for derivative contracts 
of non-residents, aimed at reducing the profitability and 
volumes of foreign-exchange contracts. 
Indonesia Announcements by the government of a minimum holding 
period for central bank bills. 
South Africa Reserve accumulation, loosening of exchange controls for 
capital outflows of residents and raising of the maximum 
investment authorised overseas. 
South Korea Bill submitted by South Korean lawmakers in November to 
impose a 14 percent withholding tax on interest income on 
bonds bought by foreign investors as well as a 20 percent 
capital-gains tax. Auditing of banks handling foreign 
derivative contacts. 
 
Specific measures announced in July to mitigate the 
volatility of capital flows: ceilings on FX derivative positions 
of banks, regulations on the use of foreign currency loans, 
tightening of regulation on foreign currency liquidity of 
banks. 
Thailand Introduction of a 15 percent withholding tax in October, 
applicable to interest income and capital gains on Thai debt 
for foreign investors. Officials have announced that they 
are studying the use of levies to control capital inflows, but 
not for short-term use. 
Source: IIF, Financial Times, Reuters. 
 
The third issue – unconventional monetary policy measures – came to the fore after the 
announcement in November 2010 by the Federal Open Market Committee of a $600bn 
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asset-purchase programme (QE2). This was widely seen in Europe and in the emerging 
world as an attempt to depreciate the US dollar. It prompted a series of negative 
reactions from senior policymakers in Europe, China and several emerging countries. 
Although Bernanke (2010) emphasises that “the best way to continue to deliver the 
strong economic fundamentals that underpin the value of the dollar, as well as to support 
the global recovery, is through policies that lead to a resumption of robust growth”, the 
Fed’s policy continues to be disputed. This raises the question of how to determine when 
a monetary policy conducted in a floating exchange-rate regime context can be 
considered ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’. While the current emphasis is on the Federal 
Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan have also adopted similar measures 
in the past year (Table 3). The European Central Bank’s purchase of periphery euro-area 
sovereign bonds is primarily aimed at improving the liquidity of these particular 
government bond markets and is deliberately sterilised, so it cannot be regarded as a 
way to stimulate the economy. 
 
Table 3: Unconventional measures by major central banks 
 
No expansion of base 
money (qualitative easing) 
Expansion of base money 
(quantitative easing) 
Purchase of private assets 
(credit easing) 
ECB BoE, BoJ, Fed, SNB 
Purchase of government 
bonds 
ECB BoE, BoJ, Fed 
Purchase of foreign-
currency assets (forex 
intervention) 
 BOJ, SNB 
Source: Adapted and updated from Meier (2009). 
 
2.3. Exchange rate developments 
 
With this background in mind, we now turn to assessment. How significant are recent 
exchange rate movements? To shed light on this, we scrutinise exchange rate 
developments from a medium-term (1995-2010) perspective. The most reasonable 
benchmark for assessing the value of a currency is a comparison to its equilibrium value. 
Unfortunately, methods for calculating equilibrium exchange rates all suffer from 
weaknesses and lead to largely diverse results: for example, estimates presented in 
Evenett (2010) suggest that the Chinese renminbi’s undervaluation ranges between zero 
percent and 50 percent. The recent estimates by IMF (2010b) for major G20 regions are 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 indicates asymmetries. Advanced countries are estimated to be somewhat 
overvalued, while other emerging countries (Russia, South Africa and Turkey) are 
substantially overvalued, Asia is substantially undervalued, and the results for Latin 
America vary between models.  
 
There are also likely asymmetries within each region. Country-specific data is 
unfortunately not available, but, for example, it is likely that the euro is much more 
overvalued than the British pound, or that the Brazilian real is more overvalued than the 
Argentine peso.  
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Lacking proper and up-to-date country-specific misalignment estimates, we use in the 
following sections the index of the real effective exchange rate, which measures the 
change in the inflation-adjusted exchange rate vis-à-vis the weighted average of trading 
partners compared to a base period. 
 
Table 4: G20: Assessment of real effective exchange rate (percent deviation 
from medium-term equilibrium valuation) 
 
Macroeconomic 
Balance 
approach 
Equilibrium Real 
Exchange Rate 
approach 
External 
Sustainability 
approach 
Advanced 5.6 2.8 5.1 
Asia -14.8 -6.6 -12.6 
Latin America 8.9 -1.3 4.5 
Other 5.8 12.1 15.0 
Source: Table 1 from IMF (2010b). 
Note: IMF (2010b) indicates that results reported are still a work in progress. Advanced: US, EU, Japan, UK, 
Canada and Australia); Asia: China, Korea, Indonesia and India; Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina; 
Other: Russia, Turkey and South Africa. The estimates of ‘under’ or ‘over’ valuation of the REER are based on 
three approaches used by staff to assess misalignments: macroeconomic balance, equilibrium real exchange 
rate and external sustainability. IMF staff does not assess REER for oil exporters. Unfortunately information is 
not available about the period to which the misalignment calculations refer to. 
 
2.3.1. Medium-term movements 
Figure 1 shows the change in the real effective exchange rate since January 1995 for the 
23 countries listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3, plus Germany, Australia and New Zealand (three 
countries in which there was no intervention aimed at weakening the currency) and 
China (which pegs its currency to the US dollar). The general impression is that apart 
from a few exceptions, movements over the past few months have not been out of the 
ordinary relative to the trends of the past 15 years. It is more likely that fears over 
economic growth and unemployment in a less dynamic global environment make the 
currency issue more acute. 
 
Only some countries can justify complaints about sharp appreciations. For example, India 
experienced a steady real appreciation (likely reflecting its economic catching-up) until 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, when the pace of appreciation 
speeded up. Another example is Brazil, which had a rather strong exchange rate before 
Lehman’s collapse, and faced a sharp, but only temporary depreciation after the Lehman 
shock and its current real exchange rate is very high by historical standards.  
 
But there are also countries for which the extent of currency appreciation does not seem 
to be worrying when looking at this longer time horizon. For example, South Korea’s 
current real exchange rate level is still well below what it was around 2005, which leads 
some observers, especially in Japan, to claim that Korea’s policy is one of deliberate 
depreciation. But Japan’s real exchange rate level is also not exceptional: even though 
the Japanese yen experienced a huge jump from a historically low level at the time of the 
Lehman shock, the current rate is similar to the average value of about an eight-year 
period between 1996 and 2004. Egypt’s real exchange rate is about 40 percent above its 
July 2007 value, but Figure 1 shows that it also had a historically low value in 2007. 
Israel’s real rate is close to its average over the past 15 years. Taiwan and especially 
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Argentina long followed a policy of keeping their currencies down and the crisis has not 
changed this policy.1 
 
It is also interesting to observe that the Australian dollar’s current real rate is well above 
the values observed in the past 16 years, but despite this development Australia has not 
been regarded as a participant in the recent ‘currency war’. 
 
All in all, our assessment shows that the recent changes in real effective exchange rates 
are not significant enough by themselves to justify speaking about a serious currency 
war. But they are substantial enough to bring to the fore the more fundamental issue of 
Chinese exchange rate fixity and capital controls, and those of a few other emerging 
countries in the current feeble global economy, since resumed capital flows to emerging 
countries now disproportionately impact some of those countries that have no or minor 
restrictions on capital inflows. 
 
                                                 
1 It is also important to highlight that real exchange rate appreciation is an equilibrium phenomenon in 
countries that are on a catching-up economic growth path. Since most emerging countries shown are on such a 
growth path, one should have expected a trend real appreciation, but this was not the case for many of these 
countries. 
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Figure 1: Real effective exchange rates based on consumer prices (January 
1995=100), January 1995 - November 2010 
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Source: authors' calculations using data from the IMF International Financial Statistics (USD exchange rates 
and consumer prices), Datastream (USD exchange rates for periods that are missing from the IMF database), 
National Statistics of the Taiwan Province of China (USD exchange rate and consumer price index for Taiwan). 
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Note: increases in the index indicate real appreciation. The real effective exchange rate is calculated against 
143 trading partners, covering, on average, 98.8 percent of foreign trade. Weights are derived on the basis of 
Bayoumi, Lee and Jaewoo (2006). The vertical dashed line indicates September 2008. Consumer prices are 
available till July 2010 in most cases: we have projected the consumer prices index till November 2010 by 
assuming that 12-month inflation rate does not change between the latest available observation and November 
2010. Monthly average exchange rates are used up to October 2010, while the 29 November 2010 rates are 
used for November 2010. 
 
2.3.2. Advanced versus emerging countries 
So far we have computed trade-weighted real effective exchange rates for individual 
countries in relation to 143 other countries of the world. It is also possible to construct 
an effective exchange rate index between two groups of countries. Gouardo and Pisani-
Ferry (2010) construct the index between two blocs of countries, ‘advanced’ and 
‘emerging’. The sample is not comprehensive but it contains all major countries: it is 
comprised of the top 20 countries in terms of total trade (excluding euro-area countries), 
plus the euro area.  In order to ensure a minimal degree of homogeneity with respect to 
the shock of the financial crisis, the group of advanced countries includes only western 
countries plus Japan (countries such as Singapore, or South Korea thus fall into the other 
group).2 
 
This simple, summary indicator helps to monitor the evolution of exchange rates between 
advanced and emerging economies. The ‘effective exchange rate of emerging countries 
against advanced countries’ is not simply the inverse of the ‘effective rate of advanced 
countries vis-à-vis emerging countries’, due to different weights (Figure 2), though the 
two series largely mirror each other. 
 
Figure 2 shows long real exchange rate swings between the two major regions. Emerging 
countries appreciated until about mid-1997, when a series of contagious crises (in Asia, 
Brazil, Russia) pushed their currencies sharply down. Then they appreciated again until 
about 2001, when a new wave of emerging market crises (originating in Argentina, Brazil 
and Turkey) and the depreciation of the US dollar pushed them down again. The next 
rebound lasted until the summer of 2008, when emerging countries were close to their 
previous record high levels; this time the sudden stopping of capital inflows that followed 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers led again to a fall in their currencies. But the rebound 
was quite quick, most likely because previous emerging market crises had their origins in 
the unsustainable positions of certain emerging countries, while the current crisis has 
originated in the advanced world. By summer 2010 the real effective exchange rate index 
of the emerging countries was close to the pre-Lehman level. It has depreciated 
somewhat since because of a dollar effect: those emerging countries that tightly peg 
their currencies to the dollar (China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates) have 
all depreciated vis-à-vis the advanced countries’ group, while the currencies of India, 
Korea, Mexico, Poland and Thailand have appreciated. While volatility was high during 
recent periods, taking again a historical view, Figure 2 does not suggest that the recent 
period was extraordinary. On the contrary, what is extraordinary is the fact that despite 
an asymmetric shock of exceptional magnitude, emerging countries as a group have not 
appreciated markedly in real terms since summer 2007. 
 
This observation does not exclude that from the point of view of individual countries, 
pressures to appreciate are seen as a threat to competitiveness and export-led growth. 
But this signals a collective-action problem within the emerging group rather than 
                                                 
2 Advanced countries (Australia, Canada, Euro Area, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, United States, United 
Kingdom) and emerging countries (Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Arab Emirates). 
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excessive appreciation of the group. 
 
Figure 2: Real effective exchange rates between emerging countries and 
advanced countries (based on consumer prices, July 2007=100), January 1995 - 
November 2010 
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Source: updated and corrected from Gouardo and Pisani-Ferry (2010).  
Note: the increase in the index indicates real appreciation. The vertical dashed line shows September 2008. 
 
2.3.3. A look at the euro 
So far we have looked at the real effective exchange rate of Germany, the largest euro-
area country. The real effective exchange rate of Germany also takes into account intra 
euro-area trade and therefore the euro/dollar rate or the effective external exchange rate 
of the euro has lesser impact. But it also makes sense to look at the euro area as a whole 
and to analyse the euro’s external nominal and real exchange rate.3 
 
Let us start with the nominal exchange rate of the euro against the dollar, which is 
presented in Figure 3 along with its purchasing power parity value.4 It is important to 
notice that the euro-dollar exchange rate continues to stay well above its equilibrium 
value as defined by purchasing power parity since mid-2003. While the euro area's 
problems undoubtedly triggered the depreciation earlier this year, they were in fact just a 
correction toward equilibrium. As a consequence, the euro seems to have been 
overvalued against the dollar since about mid-2003. 
 
                                                 
3 The importance of any measure of the real exchange rate can be assessed on the basis of trade/GDP ratios: 
eg the importance of the real effective exchange rate of Germany against all countries can be assessed on the 
basis of total German exports and imports, while the importance of the external real rate of the euro can be 
assessed on the basis of extra-euro-area exports and imports of Germany and other euro-area countries. 
4 Purchasing power parity is a contentious equilibrium concept, but still can serve as a rough benchmark. 
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Figure 3: Exchange rate of the euro against the US dollar and the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) conversion rate, 4 January 1999 – 29 November 2010 
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Source: daily market rate: ECB; implied PPP conversion rate: authors’ calculations using data from the IMF 
World Economic Outlook October 2010. The PPP conversion rate is available for each euro-area member state 
and we have calculated a time-varying weighted average (considering only those countries that were member 
of the euro area in the given year; using given year shares in aggregate euro-area GDP). 
Note: an increase in the index indicates appreciation of the euro. A fixed-weight average of the PPP conversion 
rates of the first 12 countries that adopted the euro remains within plus/minus 0.6 percent range around the 
shown time-varying weighted average during 2001-10. 
 
In Tables 1, 2 and 3 we listed 23 countries that can be considered as having directly or 
indirectly participated in the currency war: four advanced economies (US, Japan, UK and 
Switzerland) and 19 emerging countries. The left hand panel of Figure 4 shows long term 
(1970-2010) bilateral real exchange rate of the euro area against these four advanced 
economies. The right hand panel shows the external real effective exchange rate against 
143 countries (all countries for which exchange rate and consumer price index data are 
available at least for the 1995-2010 period) and against the 19 floating emerging 
countries that participated in the currency war. 
 
The long-term trends and recent levels of bilateral real exchange rates against the four 
advanced countries do not suggest any extraordinary movement that Europe should be 
concerned about. Against the US dollar, for example, the euro is at about the average 
level of 1990-96 and well below its summer 2008 peak level. Since July 2007, the euro 
has appreciated against the British pound, but its current level is quite similar to the 
average of the past four decades, and the euro has depreciated against both the 
Japanese yen and the Swiss franc.  
 
In real effective terms (right hand panel of Figure 4), the euro is well below its average 
2002-08 value. Consider only the 19 floating currency war emerging countries, the euro’s 
real value is close to historical lows. 
 
Consequently, since July 2007 the euro has gained competitiveness against almost all 
countries regarded as having participated in the currency war (only the British pound has 
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depreciated against the euro, while the US dollar is practically at the same level as July 
2007). Therefore, the complaint of euro-area policymakers about the partial reversal of 
the euro’s fall since July 2007 is not well founded. 
 
Figure 4: External real exchange rate of the euro (January 1995=100) 
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January 1970 – November 2010 
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Source: see at Figure 1. 
Note: see at Figure 1. An increase in the index indicates real appreciation of the euro against the countries 
indicated in the legend. The vertical dashed line indicates September 2008. 
  
 
3. MOTIVES FOR POLICY MEASURES IMPACTING 
CURRENCY MOVEMENTS 
 
3.1. The output shock 
There is a fundamental asymmetry between advanced and emerging countries 
concerning the impact of the shock on the real economy during the crisis, and also 
considering longer term growth developments. In advanced countries, private 
deleveraging remains incomplete while public deleveraging has barely started, and 
demand is set to remain subdued for years to come. But the developing and emerging 
countries remain on a growth track. Figure 5 presents the diverging developments by 
showing GDP, normalised as 2007=100, as seen in October 2007 and in October 2010 in 
the two main country groups5 and a few selected countries. 
 
                                                 
5 The compositions of the advanced and emerging country groups are identical to the groups shown in Figure 3; 
see footnote 2. 
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Figure 5: GDP forecasts to 2012: October 2007 versus October 2010 
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Source: authors’ calculations using data from the October 2007 and October 2010 IMF World Economic 
Outlooks. 
Note: due to revisions of historical data, the pre-2007 data are not identical in the two vintages. 
 
Emerging countries were barely hit with the exception of eastern European emerging 
countries, such as Russia. But Brazil, India and China have not been hit at all. 
 
By contrast, advanced countries have been hit hard on average and positive examples 
are rare. Australia is one positive example, having not suffered too much from the crisis 
and having one of the best growth prospects among advanced economies. This likely 
explains its absence from the currency war dispute despite having a strong currency: 
instead, Glenn Stevens, governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, has welcomed a 
stronger exchange rate (see Goodman and Zachariahs, 2010). 
 
But most other advanced countries suffered in the crisis, even though there are quite 
significant differences between the euro area, Japan, the UK and the US (Figure 6). 
These differences warrant different policy responses (Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2010): 
 
• First, US GDP declined less and recovered faster than in the euro area, Japan or 
the UK – though it remains early days for a recovery, which seems to weakening 
in the US, and perhaps strengthening in northern continental Europe;  
• Second, US employment declined much more than European, Japanese and UK 
employment and did not start exhibiting feeble signs of recovery until early 2010. 
Consequently, the 2008-09 employment decline was exceptionally deep and 
prolonged in the US whereas in Europe (including the UK) and Japan it was not 
exceptional;  
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• Third, as a result, productivity developments have been strikingly divergent. Nine 
quarters after the start of the recession, GDP per employee had increased by 
about 4 percent (the more appropriate measure of productivity, GDP per hour, 
had increased by about 7 percent) in the US whereas it was still below the initial 
pre-crisis level in the euro area, Japan and the UK;  
• Fourth, Japan’s investment was the hardest hit: it fell by 35 percent with major 
consequences for potential output developments. There are less pronounced 
differences in the US, the UK and the euro area, despite the differences in growth 
rates and financial systems.  
 
Figure 6: Impact of the crisis on GDP, employment, output per hour and non-
residential investment in the euro area the UK, Japan and the US (Percent 
movement per quarter from pre-recession output peak) 
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
GDP
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Employment
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Euro Area Japan United Kingdom United States
GDP per employee
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Non-residential investment
 
Source: updated from Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2010) using data from OECD and Datastream. 
Note: pre-recession output peak is 2008Q1 for euro area, Japan and UK, 2008Q2 for US 
 
It is not entirely clear why there was a big divergence in employment and therefore 
productivity between the US and Europe (where the evolutions in the euro area and the 
UK are remarkably similar). Part of the explanation is that US companies, which are less 
constrained by firing restrictions, traditionally adjust their payrolls faster than European 
counterparts. But if this was the only reason, the evolution in the UK, which also has 
what is considered to be a flexible labour market, should mimic that of the US.6 Part has 
to do with specific shocks affecting the real estate and finance sectors, which had grown 
very large in the US compared, on average, to Europe. And part results from the fact 
that in response to the crisis, several European governments introduced or strengthened 
                                                 
6 A country where employment has evolved in a similar way to the US is Spain, where employers have made 
use of the flexibility offered by temporary contracts. 
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schemes aimed at encouraging job preservation, such as the German Kurtzarbeit (IMF, 
2010a); those policies, however, did not include all countries with limited unemployment 
rises, such as the UK. The strength of the post-recession US productivity boom and the 
subdued productivity response in most of continental Europe remain puzzling (Wilson, 
2010). 
 
 
3.2. Private deleveraging 
The strength of domestic demand in the short to medium run largely depends on the 
extent to which private agents will engage in deleveraging.  To assess the comparative 
situation in the US, the euro area and the UK, Table 5 shows changes in levels of 
indebtedness from 1999 to 2007, and from 2007 to 2009. The numbers seem to tell a 
clear story.  
 
In the 2000s, households went much more into debt in the US and the UK than in the 
euro area. The contrast is striking, with the rise in household indebtedness as a share of 
GDP in the US and the UK three times larger than for the euro area – and in 1999 the 
initial levels of household debt in the euro area was already significantly smaller than in 
the US.  The change in non-financial corporate indebtedness offers a more comparable 
transatlantic picture, though the lower increase in the US may be explained by the 
greater reliance on capital markets by US firms.  
 
There are signs that the deleveraging process for households and perhaps non-financial 
corporations has begun in the US, though on a limited scale so far. It is not clear that 
such a process is inevitable for the euro area as a whole – though of course the 
divergences in indebtedness among member countries are quite enormous (and 
deleveraging has begun in Ireland and Spain). On the whole, balance sheet data justifies 
more concern about the risks of sluggish demand and recovery in the US and the UK 
than in continental Europe, while also underlining the greater unsustainability of 
borrowing patterns in the US.  
 
Table 5: Level and changes in indebtedness (percent of GDP) 
 Households 
Non-financial 
corporations 
 US UK EA US UK EA 
1999 69.0 68.5 49.5 62.8 71.6 66.9 
2003 83.3 82.8 53.5 64.3 86.3 81.5 
2007 96.6 98.4 61.2 74.1 106.6 90.9 
2009 95.3 103.3 65.5 76.1 120.6 100.5 
Change 1999-2007 27.6 30.0 11.7 11.3 35.0 24.0 
Change 2007-2009 -1.3 4.8 4.3 2.1 14.0 9.6 
Source: Table 1 from Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2010). 
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3.3. The quantitative easing debate 
Whatever the US domestic debate, the rest of the world is highly doubtful about the US 
Federal Reserve programme of asset purchases (QE2). The Europeans have been 
especially vocal but there are also fears about its consequences in Japan and the 
emerging world. Critics argue that QE2 leads to the weakening of the dollar vis-à-vis 
floating exchange rate countries, and to capital outflows especially to emerging countries. 
Capital flows to emerging countries either push up their exchange rates, or, if emerging 
country central banks intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist appreciation 
and are not able to sterilise the resulting money creation, inflation pressures will raise. 
Inflation pressures will necessitate interest rate hikes, thereby providing further 
incentives for capital inflows. 
 
The question is, can QE2 be characterised as beggar-thy-neighbour?  
 
In a recent speech, Bernanke (2010) said that asset purchases by the Fed are only the 
continuation of conventional monetary policy by other means, the difference being that 
they affect the interest rates of longer maturity securities, whereas conventional 
monetary policy primarily affects the short end of the yield curve. If this definition is 
accepted, then it follows that the criterion for determining whether QE can be considered 
beggar-thy-neighbour is the same as for conventional monetary policy. 
 
There is no explicit criterion for assessing the cooperative character of monetary policy 
and the resulting exchange-rate developments. There was one in the post-war fixed 
exchange-rate regime as currency devaluation was subject to the IMF and to the scrutiny 
of partners. Parity adjustments within the earlier European Monetary System were also 
assessed by partners (and are still subject to approval in the current EMR-2 system). 
There was also a brief interlude in the second half of the 1980s during which the G7 
targeted exchange rate developments.7 But no such criterion exists in a floating 
exchange rate regime based on the principle of monetary policy autonomy.  
 
An implicit criterion however has emerged from the central banks’ practice of the last two 
decades: as long as monetary policy remained geared towards price stability as usually 
defined – say, an inflation objective in the 1-3 percent range – it has been generally 
assessed in line with the requirements, or at least the spirit of international cooperation.  
 
If this implicit criterion is also accepted the question becomes twofold: 
 
• First, what does this definition become in a context in which inflation objectives 
are frequently undershot? If the inflation objective is, say, two percent, but actual 
inflation one percent for an extended period because of the extent of economic 
slack, one central bank (say, the ECB) may conclude that it has to accept that it is 
temporarily unable to reach its objective, whereas the other (say, the Fed) may 
conclude that it needs to commit even more strongly to reaching the inflation 
objective, possibly by adopting a price-level instead of a price-change target. This 
would lead to significant monetary policy divergence with immediate 
consequences for the exchange rate (even if these consequences would be offset 
in the medium term by inflation differentials). This is entirely a monetary policy 
issue that arises from the lack of a commonly agreed definition of cooperative 
policy in a deflationary environment.  
• Second, is monetary policy geared towards price stability in the medium run? This 
boils down to determining if there is a risk of fiscal dominance, ie of an 
                                                 
7 From 1980-85 the US dollar appreciated sharply (see eg the euro/dollar real exchange rate on Figure 4) 
largely due to the Fed’s aggressive anti-inflationary monetary policy. On 22 September 1985 at the Plaza Hotel 
in New York City, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US agreed to coordinated central bank intervention 
to depreciate the US dollar (the ‘Plaza Accord’). The US dollar consequently started to depreciate. But the speed 
and the magnitude of the dollar’s slide was seen as excessive. Therefore, on 22 February 1987, at the Louvre in 
Paris, the five countries plus Canada reached an agreement to halt the decline of the US dollar and to stabilise 
the international currency markets (the ‘Louvre Accord’). 
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unsustainable fiscal policy ultimately leading to an irresistible pressure to 
monetise the public debt. The problem here is not the monetary policy stance 
itself, rather its sustainability in the absence of a framework guaranteeing fiscal 
discipline. 
 
The exchange-rate consequences of different monetary policy attitudes in a deflationary 
context are limited. They may drive a temporary depreciation of the dollar exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the euro and other currencies, but they are unlikely to result in major 
misalignments. For example, the estimates presented in Neely (2010) suggest that the 
Fed’s first asset-purchase programme (QE1) between November 2008 and March 2009 
had a cumulative downward impact on the dollar of 6.5 percent against various 
currencies of advanced countries. The calculations of Joyce et al (2010) suggest that the 
Bank of England’s asset purchase had a three percent cumulative effect on the exchange 
rate of sterling (four percent initial impact of which one percent was corrected later). 
These estimates, which should be cautiously assessed, do not suggest that QE had a 
significant impact on exchange rates. Furthermore, Neely (2010) finds that the Fed’s QE1 
did not decrease US yields only, but also had a sizeable downward impact on yields of 
other advanced countries.8 And US 10-year bond yields are not extraordinary low by 
international comparisons (Figure 7). 
 
At least in principle, spillovers to other advanced countries can be limited by discussions 
between central banks on the interpretation of their price stability mandate in a 
deflationary context. The more difficult issue is clearly related to increased capital inflows 
to emerging countries with flexible exchange rates and the associated problems the 
inflows cause. But as we argued, the acute nature of this issue is primarily the 
consequence of asymmetric openness of emerging countries: since some major players, 
such as China, retain broad-based capital controls, capital inflows impact those emerging 
countries that have more liberalised capital accounts. 
 
But the consequences of an expectation of debt monetisation would be much more 
severe as its effects would extend beyond the relatively short-term monetary policy 
horizon. It would in all likelihood lead market participants to short the currency, 
triggering a major real depreciation in the short term. In Europe, all governments have 
plans to restore budgetary sustainability. In the US, partisan strife over budgetary policy 
leads to concern that the Fed will ultimately have to inflate the problem away, even 
though longer-term US inflation expectations remain near historic lows (Table 6). Recent 
reactions to fiscal consolidation proposals9 suggest that the US has got perilously close to 
the ‘war of attrition’ situation once described by Alesina and Drazen (1991). This, more 
than the Fed’s stance, is the real danger. 
 
                                                 
8 For example, he finds that QE1 between November 2008 and March 2009 lowered US 10-year government 
bond yields by 107 basis points, but at the same time it lowered the 10-year yield in Australia by 78 basis 
points, in Canada by 54 basis points, in Germany by 50 basis points, in Japan by 19 basis points and in the UK 
by 65 basis points. 
9 On 10 November 2010 the co-chairs of the bipartisan Simpson-Bowles Fiscal Commission appointed by 
President Obama presented preliminary findings and recommendations for deficit reduction. A few days later, 
on 17 November, the Domenici-Rivlin panel appointed by the Bipartisan Policy Center also presented 
recommend-actions for deficit reduction. Both sets of proposals failed to command consensus, on the contrary 
spending cuts were flatly rejected by senior Democrats while tax increases were rejected by senior Republicans. 
  19
Table 6: US inflation expectations (percent) 
 Date of inflation expectations formation 
Horizon 
Jan 
2007 
July 
2007 
Jan 
2008 
July 
2008 
Jan 
2009 
July 
2009 
Jan 
2010 
July 
2010 
Nov 
2010 
1 year 2.7 2.6 2.5 3.0 0.5 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.4 
10 years 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.5 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
Note: See the description of the methodology in Haubrich (2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: 10-year benchmark government bond yields, 3 January 2005 – 29 
November 2010 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EURO 
AREA 
 
There are different elements of the currency war dispute, which have different impacts 
on the global economy and on Europe: 
 
1 The most significant is the fundamental issue of the long-term currency peg of 
some important countries, most notably China. 
2 There have been several recent attempts to impact the exchange rate of 
countries having floating exchange-rate regimes.  
3 The third is quantitative easing by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England 
and the Bank of Japan. 
 
We are concerned about the first element of currency war for three reasons: 
 
First, while estimates of equilibrium exchange rates from different models vary 
widely, the typical result shows undervaluation of the Chinese renminbi. This by itself 
would justify some nominal appreciation and will lead to gradual real appreciation 
through higher Chinese inflation if the nominal exchange rate is kept stable.10  
 
Second, the crisis impacted emerging and advanced countries in an asymmetric way. 
Non-European emerging countries were not hit much by the crisis, while advanced 
countries suffered much more. In advanced countries, private deleveraging and public 
consolidation are likely to continue to represent a drag on domestic demand. This 
fundamental asymmetry will need to be compensated for by some form of adjustment 
in relative prices, even though exports from the block of advanced countries to the 
block of emerging countries still represent only a small share of GDP.11 The real 
effective exchange rate of emerging countries sharply depreciated after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers and so far it has reverted to its pre-Lehman level. But further 
adjustment may be needed and there is also an asymmetry within the emerging 
country group: while China and some Middle Eastern countries peg their currencies to 
the US dollar, which is weakening partly due to US monetary policy, emerging 
countries with floating exchange rates and open capital accounts have to face 
increasing capital inflows. With a view to economic growth and competitiveness 
relative to China, many of these countries would like to resist capital inflows by 
employing various policy actions, which have led their participation in the second form 
of currency war. 
 
Third, there is a risk that the US may retaliate against Chinese currency fixity with 
tariffs and possible other trade measures, which may give rise to the adoption of 
protectionist measures elsewhere in the world as well. The experience of the 1930s 
suggests that this would prolong economic stagnation. 
 
                                                 
10 Note however that parts, components and semi-finished goods are a large share of US imports from China. 
An appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar would increase the cost of these intermediate inputs; 
therefore it is not clear what impact a renminbi appreciation would have on US growth and jobs. Using a 
computational model of global trade Francois (2010) even concludes that a renminbi appreciation or a trade 
war between the US and China would lead to US job losses, but would improve the US trade balance. 
11 The exports of the block of advanced countries to all other countries make up 7.6 percent of advanced 
countries GDP, of which 2.9 percent goes to the group of emerging countries used in our study and 4.7 percent 
to other countries. Note that export is a gross measure and therefore the GDP share of added value in exports 
is even lower. 
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We are less worried about the second and third elements of currency war, even though 
about 20 floating exchange rate countries have adopted measures to resist currency 
appreciation or weaken their currencies, indicating that the ‘war’ is widespread.  
 
The US and the UK implemented quantitative easing primarily for domestic policy 
purposes and not with the prime purpose of influencing the exchange rate: although we 
do not deny that they may adversely impact other countries, our assessment is that at 
present these policy measures remain broadly in line with domestic economic 
developments. As observed by Eichengreen (2010), simultaneous monetary easing by 
quantitative easing and unsterilised foreign exchange intervention is not a zero-sum 
game and the resulting monetary stimulus may have a positive impact on growth, 
benefiting also those countries that have not participated in this ‘war’.  
 
Concerning emerging countries that try to resist capital flows, their efforts are also 
justified for two main reasons: (1) quantitative easing in the US is likely to induce capital 
inflows to these countries and (2) China keeps a peg to the dollar. While a collective 
appreciation of the whole emerging country region against advanced countries may be 
warranted, no emerging country would like to appreciate against China.  
 
Our more benign view of these second and third elements of currency war is also 
supported by recent developments in real effective exchange rates, which do not indicate 
significant impacts, at least so far: countries participating in this war have not achieved a 
marked depreciation of their currencies and in fact most of them are still experiencing 
appreciation. These developments suggest that the weapons used to fight the war may 
not be very effective in most cases. 
 
Concerning the euro, its exchange rate has not been impacted much by the recent 
‘currency war’, at least so far: it continues to be overvalued, but to a lesser extent than 
before Lehman’s collapse. The euro exchange rate is also significantly impacted by 
market perceptions concerning the sovereign debt crisis of some periphery euro-area 
members. A sizeable depreciation of the euro earlier this year was the result of this 
internal crisis and the recent recovery of the euro can also be the consequence of 
brighter market perceptions about the future of the euro area. 
 
The implications for Europe of the three elements of ‘currency wars’ follow our 
assessments. European policymakers should not criticise floating exchange rate emerging 
countries that try to resist capital inflows, at least while China keeps its exchange rate 
system unchanged. The European critique of the Fed’s recent quantitative easing 
measures is also not well grounded while the Fed’s monetary policy remains geared 
towards price stability and does not amount to a monetisation of the public debt. But 
central banks should agree a consensus about the definition of internationally acceptable 
policies in a time of deflationary pressures. In particular, major central banks should 
agree on whether or not a price level target is warranted (which would compensate 
temporary below-target inflation with temporary above-target inflation later). 
 
The most delicate issue remains the dollar peg of a large number of emerging countries. 
Goldberg (2010) reports the shocking number than 50 percent of all countries of the 
world use the dollar, or peg to the dollar, or tightly manage the exchange rate to the 
dollar, and these countries constitute 36 percent of world GDP. Of these countries China 
and some Middle East countries stand out by their size. This issue is undoubtedly related 
to the renewed debate on the international monetary system, in which Europe has so far 
kept a low profile. The recent crisis has clearly showed serious flaws of the current ‘non-
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system’ (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry, 2010). It is in Europe’s best interest to foster a reform 
of the international monetary system, including the design of mechanisms that can help 
to correct global imbalances. 
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